The first days of the implementation of Resolution 1973: an unclear coalition and unclear responsibilities

 Posted by: Bérénice Boutin

In international military operations, the determination of international responsibilities for the wrongful acts committed during operations depends on cooperation settings, and notably on arrangements regarding command and control over the troops. Regarding those terms, the operation undertaken in implementation of UNSC Resolution 1973 is conspicuously unclear. The option of a coalition of willing States has been adopted, and many States declared their willingness to participate to operations in pursuance of Resolution 1973, while the United States, France and the United Kingdom started operations.

At this stage, the ambiguity stems from the individualization of national operations: Operation Odyssey Dawn is the code name of the US operation, while France conducts Operation Harmattan, and the UK Operation ELLAMY. During the first days of the operation, no central command and control has been vested in one country, and the US is merely coordinating the operations.

Whether those three states are jointly liable at this stage is doubtful. The case for joint responsibility is not easy to make when the acts of each states can be clearly separated. Besides, since no single authority is vested with command and control over the operation, attribution is logically individualized.

Despite political disagreements, it is expected that NATO will end up participating in the operations, and probably will hold operational command and control and hence responsibility in case of violations of international law.

Apologies are not enough: on the practical importance of implementing international responsibility

 Posted by: Bérénice Boutin

The accidental killing of nine Afghan children by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the beginning of March led to apologies by the ISAF commander General Petraeus. Those excuses were rejected by President Karzai as insufficient. It is indeed expected that in case of military acts breaching international law, the ISAF should provide financial compensation for the injuries caused, not only satisfaction in the form of official apologies.

Assuming that those deaths occurred in breach of international humanitarian law, the ISAF is internationally responsible for the injuries it caused. The obligation of full reparation that automatically flows from international responsibility should take the form of financial compensation in the case of personal injuries. Satisfaction is only an acceptable remedy if the injury cannot be repaired by restitution or compensation. Rather, the ISAF should provide financial compensation to victims of violations of international law by the ISAF troops.

Even though the ISAF troops kills less civilians than the Taliban insurgents, they ‘appear to reverberate more deeply because of underlying animosity about foreigners in the country’. It is thus important for the success of such a foreign military intervention that the ISAF establishes procedures enabling victims to claim compensation for the damages caused by wrongful acts of the troops.

Academic legal research on the accountability of international military operations is partly grounded in the idea that holding international troops responsible for their wrongful acts is particularly important in practice when it comes to foreign troops enforcing an international objective.