About

The SHARES Project examined an unexplored and largely unrecognised problem: the allocation of international responsibility among multiple states and other actors. It uncovered the nature and extent of the problem of sharing responsibility in an increasingly interdependent and heterogeneous international legal order. The Project produced output, offering new concepts, principles and perspectives for understanding how the international legal order may deal with shared responsibility. SHARES was a research project of the Amsterdam Center for International Law, a leading research center within the University of Amsterdam. It was funded by a European Research Council Advanced Grant of 2.1 million euro, obtained in 2010 by Professor André Nollkaemper. The Project ran until the end of 2015.
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 13, 2014

A shared obligation to negotiate (and achieve?) nuclear disarmament

 Posted by: 

Every year since the International Court of Justice’s 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the UN General Assembly has adopted by a large majority a follow-up resolution. Each resolution reiterates that ‘the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to humanity and all life on Earth’, and underlines ‘the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control’. The ICJ derived this obligation from Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which provides that

[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

On 24 April 2014 the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) instituted legal proceedings before the ICJ against nine nuclear weapons possessing states: France, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, China, Russia and North KoreaThe Application states that their failure to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament amounts to a continuing breach of the obligations enshrined in Article VI NPT (to which five of these states are parties), as well as of identical obligations that exist separately under customary international law. Only Pakistanthe UK and India have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (albeit with several reservations); the remaining six states have been requested to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.

Assuming that the potential barriers to jurisdiction and admissibility would be overcome, the initiation of these proceedings calls for some reflection on the substantive content of the shared obligation(s) arising from Article VI NPT (and, if they indeed exist, identical obligations under customary international law). As the total elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved by any state in isolation, Article VI NPT requires all states parties to take part in overall disarmament efforts. But while it is clear that nuclear disarmament is a goal that can only be achieved through the combined action of all states, it remains uncertain what action is legally required of them. There exist a variety of conflicting views as to ‘what state behaviour is required to meet the nuclear disarmament obligation’.[1] Arguably, this lack of clarity has contributed to the overall failure of nuclear weapon states to take concrete steps towards the common goal of nuclear disarmament.

It has been argued that Article VI NPT ‘merely’ gives rise to an obligation to negotiate in good faith – a pactum de negotiando – which obliges individual duty-bearers to make a genuine effort towards coming to an agreement, but ‘does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement’.[2] However, in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the ICJ has held that the legal import of Article VI NPT ‘goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects – by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith’[3]. It subsequently qualified Article VI NPT as giving rise to ‘a two-fold obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations’.[4] These passages have been used to support the argument that Article VI NPT gives rise to a pactum de contrahendo – an obligation of states parties to conclude an international agreement on complete nuclear disarmament.

The difference between these two interpretations of Article VI NPT is far from negligible. An obligation to negotiate in good faith is generally considered to be an obligation of conduct, which entails that each duty-bearer can independently fulfil or breach its obligation by conducting or failing to conduct negotiations in good faith. It would be perfectly possible for one duty-bearer to fulfil its obligation by negotiating in good faith whereas another breaches its obligation by failing to do so (though how a state may demonstrate good faith will of course be up for discussion). In the end, whether or not negotiations bring about a certain result does not have a necessary bearing on the fulfilment (or breach) of the obligation to negotiate.

This seems to be different when it comes to the obligation to conclude negotiations and achieve the result of ‘nuclear disarmament in all its aspects’. If Article VI NPT indeed requires the achievement of such a result, the duty-bearers of this obligation will be highly dependent upon one another when it comes to complying with this requirement. The desired result of complete nuclear disarmament, whether or not through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty, cannot be brought about by a duty-bearer on its own; regardless of the amount of effort it puts in or the extent of good faith it displays (for example by unilaterally declaring that it will dispose of its entire nuclear arsenal). This would entail that the obligation cannot be fulfilled by any duty-bearer as long as the result of total nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. At the same time, it is not clear when this obligation would be breached, as no definitive timeframe has been set out within which negotiations should be concluded and/or complete nuclear disarmament should be achieved. Should a breach nevertheless be established, the question arises whether this would automatically result in shared responsibility for all duty-bearers.

The proceedings instituted by the RMI may provide the ICJ with an opportunity to clarify the substantive content of Article VI NPT. At first sight, the ICJ’s pronouncements in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion seem to support the argument that Article VI NPT gives rise to an obligation that goes beyond a ‘mere’ obligation to negotiate. But how far does that obligation go? Does it really require that the result of complete nuclear disarmament is achieved before duty-bearers can fulfil the obligation, regardless of the result achieved by each duty-bearer individually? Should nuclear disarmament necessarily be achieved through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty? And would a breach of the obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament entail that both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states would share the resulting responsibility?

In the midst of these uncertainties, what does seem evident is that progress towards nuclear disarmament is occurring at a disturbingly slow pace. A clarification of what it is that states must do in order to comply with their legal obligations will make it more difficult to justify their inaction; hopefully bringing us one step closer to the collective goal of nuclear disarmament.

______________________________________________________________

[1] Legal Memorandum by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and the International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, Good Faith Negotiations Leading to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice (International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 2009) at 4. Available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/docs/goodfaithnegs.pdf.

[2] Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J. Series A/B No. 42, p. 108, at p. 116.

[3] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear WeaponsAdvisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, at para. 99 (emphasis added).

[4] Ibid., at para. 100 (emphasis added).


Monday, April 7, 2014

The Shared Search for Missing Flight MH370

 Posted by: 

With Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 being officially declared lost at sea, and as the international search efforts hone in on the location of the aircraft, it is time to asses not only what this teaches us about aviation safety, but also the consequences of shared responsibility for international search and rescue operations.

Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 went missing on the 8th March, losing communication around an hour after taking off from Kuala Lumpur on route to Beijing. The fact that the airplane was missing for a number of hours, and that its communication devices were mostly switched off, meant that from the outset it was unclear where it might have come down, if indeed it had come down at all. The initial suggestions were that the plane was off the coast of Vietnam, or further out in the China Sea. This was followed by information that it had made a sharp turn towards the Straight of Malacca, and thereafter might have followed either a broad northern or southern corridor. 

On the surface, the international search effort appeared to be a good example of different countries and agencies working together. The Malaysian authorities are purportedly coordinating the search effort, which involves a number of countries as well as agencies such as the FBI and Interpol. However, dig a little deeper and the cracks begin to emerge. Not only was the search effort hampered by persisting regional tensions and mistrust, which left some countries, China in particular, reluctant to share information, but the legal framework is ill-adapted to the shared responsibility context.

The duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea is well established, both under customary law and under treaty law (Article 98 UNCLOS is one example). There are too, provisions on coordination between States in search and rescue operations. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS Convention)[1] provides that governments must coordinate search and rescue services in their areas of responsibility, as well as in its own territorial sea.[2] The Convention demarcates which State has responsibility over which areas of water, including areas of the high seas. Similarly, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 (SAR Convention) also links coordination responsibility with territory. These provisions therefore, are designed for situations where it is clear in which State’s area of responsibility the vessel or aircraft came down. Contrastingly, where an accident occurs in international waters, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), which is part of the UN, has indicated that the State of the airline takes the lead. Both approaches however, still require knowledge of where the plane crashed, as it is this that determines the State with primary responsibility for coordinating the search. What this means for instances of shared responsibility, as with flight MH370, is that the legal framework for search and rescue can delay and hamper efforts by failing to identify a clear leader.

This need to link the crash site to a particular territorial area has also delayed efforts in setting up a formal investigation into the crash under the ICAO framework. The lack of formal powers for Malaysia under this framework means that it has no exclusive control over information, and no ability to centralise evidence from different sources, such as satellite images and eyewitness accounts. Rather, it must rely on the goodwill of other States involved, which has led to delays in the conveyance of information.

There has been then, a lack of a central point where all involved parties could come together and pool the information gathered by each. In the first stages of the search, it took a number of days for China to release satellite images of what they believed to be the plane. While these images turned out to not be related to the search, one might wonder whether a freer exchange of information might have reduced the time it took for the current state of affairs to be arrived at.

All the above being said, credit must be given where credit is due. Despite the massive search area, as well as the sheer number of entities involved, the search has been relatively well coordinated, and delays in finding the wreckage are now mainly due to poor weather. However, a clearer legal framework for situations involving multiple States, and for when the whereabouts of the plane is unclear, would surely contribute to more effective search and rescue operations.



[1] This is the treaty to which all relevant States are parties.

[2] SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 7.


The chaos in Libya is also the responsibility of Europe

Posted by: Wester Karin In December 2014, the United Nations reported that in the previous months hundreds of civilians had been killed in t...