About

The SHARES Project examined an unexplored and largely unrecognised problem: the allocation of international responsibility among multiple states and other actors. It uncovered the nature and extent of the problem of sharing responsibility in an increasingly interdependent and heterogeneous international legal order. The Project produced output, offering new concepts, principles and perspectives for understanding how the international legal order may deal with shared responsibility. SHARES was a research project of the Amsterdam Center for International Law, a leading research center within the University of Amsterdam. It was funded by a European Research Council Advanced Grant of 2.1 million euro, obtained in 2010 by Professor André Nollkaemper. The Project ran until the end of 2015.

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

Book review: James Crawford, State Responsibility – The General Part (CUP, 2013)

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Forthcoming in International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2015)

Jean d’Aspremont[1]

State responsibility is one of these foundational doctrines that give shape to international law as much as it gives it teeth. State responsibility provides a conceptual framework through which inadmissible behaviours are constructed, captured and acknowledged while also endowing international law with reactionary mechanisms against those behaviours deemed unacceptable. In that sense, state responsibility is both a screen where standards about what is admissible at the international level are projected as much a parapet from which respect of those standards can be defended. Needless to say that such a twofold functional view of state responsibility is all but ontological. It is the result of certain choices made by international lawyers as well as the socio-historical circumstances in which such choices were made. It will not come as a surprise that agents and socio-historical factors have been changing throughout centuries of legal thinking, thereby bringing about severe fluctuations as to the way in which state responsibility is conceptualised as well as to the function it is due to perform. It obviously is impossible to trace and establish precisely the conceptual and functional variations that affected the development of the law of state responsibility over the last centuries. Indeed, international lawyers have little at their disposal to reconstruct the history of state responsibility, for they only have inherited a few fragments of thoughts which they are bound to read and interpret anachronistically – that is through the cognitive categories of their time.[2] The imprecision and anachronistic readings to which international lawyers are condemned when they think about the agents and socio-historical factors that have informed (and led to) the creation of the contemporary doctrine of state responsibility does however not forestall the acquisition of self-awareness for those structuring parameters. On the contrary, seeking to acquire awareness for some of them, albeit anachronistically, has become a prerequisite of what is taken as serious international legal scholarship in the 21st century.

The foregoing helps us appreciate where James Crawford’s State Responsibility – The General Part (hereafter SRGP) stands out and distinguishes itself from traditional treatises on foundational doctrines of international law.

Indeed, this impressive work does not only constitute the most authoritative and extensive treatise on the rules and practices pertaining to state responsibility. It also provides some welcome and unheard insights on the agents and the socio-historical context that contributed to the current mould of the contemporary doctrine of state responsibility. If anything, SRGP is much more than a “black letter law” presentation of the state-of-the-art. The situated dimension of the presentation gives the readers – be them practitioners or researchers – insights as to the (agenda behind) conceptual and paradigmatic choices that informed the coalescence of state responsibility as is presented in SRGP. The author’s awareness of the impact of socio-historical contexts on the design of doctrines is at its best when he defends the rise of the doctrine of responsibility as an autonomous legal category that should be seen as a post-World War 1 product. In this respect, he specifically argues that state responsibility is not a bargain between states but a “juridical construction” whose design must be understood as a “response to the ruinous world of the Great War, and a recall of the practice of responsibility as applied in the last decades of the nineteenth century, from the Alabama arbitration to the Venezuela claims and the two Hague peace conferences”.[3]

Needless to say that in sharing his self-awareness for the influence of agents and the socio-historical context on the design of the doctrine of state responsibility, James Crawford simultaneously provides the reader with an unprecedented glimpse on the agenda and the conceptual choices he himself sought to promote during his stint as Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission (hereafter the ILC). Indeed, what James Crawford lets the reader see of his self-awareness is itself a product of the paramount role he played in the design of those rules and practices. It is not necessary to recall that the author of SRGP is one of these agents whose conceptual choices proved very influential in shaping (and completing the codification) of the contemporary doctrine of state responsibility. What matters here is that SRGP shows what James Crawford thought of the work of the ancestors and masters in the field as well as the parts of this heritage that should be salvaged. In that sense, SRGP can also be read as operating a “synthesis”[4] of those accounts of the conceptual and functional variations of the law of responsibility that vindicate the best the author’s vision of the doctrine.

The vindicating dimension of the historical account provided in Part I of SRGP inevitably raises the question of whether its author still is in need to defend his vision of state responsibility. After all, his influence on the codification process, on the judicial practice, as well as the scholarship on responsibility is unequalled. And yet, according to the author of these lines, codification processes – especially of secondary rules of international law – should be understood as a dialectic and mutually reinforcing exchange between private scholarly reflection and public deliberative institutional dynamics geared towards legitimacy and acceptance.[5] According to such an understanding, the completion of a set of articles like the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts[6] (hereafter ARSIWA) does not terminate the codification process. It only marks the conferral upon the codified rules of public law-making the certification necessary to endow the secondary rules concerned with authority, which is indispensable for their global acceptance by law-applying authorities. In that context, James Crawford’s SRGP can be understood as another step in the dialectical process to stabilise the doctrine of state responsibility around the paradigmatic choices which prevailed at the ILC. Said differently, SRGP is one more exercise of persuasion to consolidate the imposition of a given approach to the law of responsibility by supplementing the ARSIWA and the official commentary by a highly authoritative scholarly study. SRGP constitutes James Crawford’s capstone to almost two decades of efforts to persuade governmental and academic audiences.

If SRGP adds the final touch to its author’s own approach to state responsibility,it is no coincidence that its structure as well as its overall conceptual framework reflects with precision the paradigmatic choices behind the ARSIWA. Indeed, a quick glance suffices to show that the book espouses the ARISWA’s paradigmatic distinctions between unlawfulness and wrongfulness or between determination of responsibility and the content of responsibility. In the same vein, SRGP vindicates the claim of a unity of the regime of responsibility, which informs the codification exercises of the ILC,[7] by approaching questions of responsibility of international organisations from the vantage point of collective and ancillary responsibility.[8] It is as if, according to SRGP, the regime of the responsibility of states and that of the responsibility of international organisations and of their member states for acts of the international organisations were part of the same regime. The consolidating virtue of SRGP also manifests itself in the author’s demonstration of the resilience of the doctrine as conceptualised in front of new phenomena – like questions of shared responsibility.[9]

It could have been expected that SRGP would not only be an attempt to consolidate the vision found in the ARSIWA, but that it would also be a platform for its author to push forward those interpretations and conceptual choices which fail to be supported by the ILC at the time. In this respect, one inevitably thinks of the famous controversy that swirled around the entitlement of non-injured states to take countermeasures in the general interest, provided that they could at least demonstrate a universal legal injury. It is well-known that in the light of the opposition within the ILC, James Crawford, an avowed proponent of that option, secured the inclusion of a saving clause, thereby leaving the resolution of the matter to further developments in international legal scholarship and practice.[10] It is remarkable that the commentary that accompanies the saving clause provided an account of the practice which, rather than supporting the open-endedness of the ARSIWA, came to buttress the entitlement of non-injured states to take countermeasures in the general interest.[11] Interestingly, SRGP does not perpetuate the ambiguity of the commentary nor does it seek to engage with that debate any further, subject to the question of the ability of injured states to call for assistance to seek redress for the breach.[12] SRGP limits itself to recall the pitted positions in the debate on Article 54 ARSIWA.[13] What is more, SRGP even seems to stick to (and vindicate) the rationale of the saving clause, thereby explicitly backing away from the support for countermeasures in the general interest that was perceptible in the commentary to Article 54.[14] It is as if the author of SRGP had come to terms with the impossibility of imposing the idea of countermeasures in the general interest and retreated from the veiled activism that infused the commentary.

The self-restraint that characterises SRGP should certainly not be bemoaned. It can even prove instrumental in the authority of the account of the doctrine of state responsibility that is offered by SRGP. In all respects, the exercise is carried out with brilliance and includes not only knowledge of the agents and socio-historical forces that influence codification processes, but also of what it takes to persuade an audience and impose one’s understanding of a doctrine. There is no doubt that this exhaustive, precise and rigorous exposé of all the dimensions of the doctrine of state responsibility will establish itself as a holy writ in terms of state responsibility.

This short review ends by shedding light on two aspects of the SRGP that could perplex some informed readers. A first remark must be formulated in connection with the rich historical overview provided by SRGP. In this respect, it is somewhat startling that Dionisio Anzilotti is not given a more prominent role. In the dominant opinion in the mainstream literature Anzilotti is seen as the great mastermind behind the contemporary doctrine of state responsibility following Ago’s extensive reliance on Anzilotti’s constructions.[15] In contrast, the author of SRGP offers a much more nuanced image. For James Crawford, the distinction between the breach of a substantive rule and responsibility for its breach dates back to Wheaton whose paradigmatic choices left an important imprint on the contemporary doctrine of responsibility.[16] In the same vein, James Crawford claims that it is Heffter’s Droit International Public de L’Europe (1857) that puts forward the notion of wrongful act (fait illicite) for the very fist time.[17] By the account made by James Crawford, the work of Anzillotti is, at best, a continuation of these ancestors, his main contribution was to elevate state responsibility as a distinct field and to distinguish between natural causality and normative causality (imputation).[18] SRGP seems to go as far as claiming that the work of Eagleton surpasses that of Anzilotti.[19] Such a departure from the mainstream understanding of the cardinal influence of Anzilotti is certainly refreshing. This treatment of the Italian master however remains question-begging. Indeed, it reinforces the above mentioned portrayal by James Crawford of the ARSIWA as synthesising a variety of heritages rather than having a clear linear paternity and a limited number of forebears.

Equally surprising is probably the way in which the charges raised against the conceptual and functional choices made by the ILC are addressed by the author of SRGP. It is certainly remarkable that, despite being himself one of the architects of the doctrine, James Crawford has no qualms confronting the criticisms that have been leveled against the current doctrine which he contributed to design.[20] But it is simultaneously astonishing that the account of the scholarly criticisms provided by SRGP leave out the well-known – and probably the most compelling – objections that were raised against the fundamental paradigmatic choices behind the ASRIWA. The criticisms that are discussed in the book only pertain to the format that has been given to the main rules[21] or their interpretive relevance.[22] Nothing is said of Philip Allott’s famous argument that the paradigmatic choices behind the ASRIWA affirm rather than constrain power and provide a convenient veil behind which morally responsible person can take shelter.[23] The same can be said about the silence of SRGP about Vaughan Lowe’s objection against the idea of precluding wrongfulness.[24] It is not that in addressing those criticisms SRGP should have revisited the paradigmatic choices that have informed the ASRIWA one more time. These choices have prevailed as a matter of social acceptance within governmental and academic audiences and it would be of no avail to reopen these debates. Yet, SRGP was maybe the ultimate opportunity to clinch once and for good the major controversies still affecting some of the paradigmatic choices behind the ASRIWA and which, to this date, have remained unaddressed.

 

[1] Professor of Public International Law, University of Manchester and Professor of International Legal Theory, University of Amsterdam. Personal SSRN page: http://www.ssrn.com/author=736816. The author wishes to thank Ilias Plakokefalos and Christiane Ahlborn for their comments on an earlier version. The usual disclaimers apply.

[2] M. Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International Law: Significance and Problems for a Critical View’ (2013) 27 Temple Journal of International and Comparative Law 215.

[3] J. Crawford, State Responsibility – The General Part (Cambridge University Press, 2013),p. 26.

[4] Ibid., section 2.1 of Part I speaks about the “modern synthesis” when presenting the ILC codification process.

[5] The argument could be made that given that the ILC has codified the most important fragment of the systemic rules of the international legal order, this public process of the production of secondary rules through the ILC is coming to an end. I have already made that argument in J. d’Aspremont, ‘Les travaux de la Commission du droit international relatifs aux actes unilatéraux des États’ (2005) 109 RGDIP 163.

[6] Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2) (ARSIWA).

[7] See C. Ahlborn, ‘The Use of Analogies in Drafting the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations – An Appraisal of the “Copy-Paste Approach”’ – (2012) 9(1) International Organizations Law Review 53-66; Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2012-98; Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2012-14; SHARES Research Paper 13 (2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2168628.

[8] See Crawford, State Responsibility – The General Part, n. 3,Part IV.

[9] Ibid.,chapter 10 (pp. 325-358) and chapter 12 (pp. 395-430).

[10] See Article 54 ARSIWA; J. Crawford, ‘third report on state responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507 and Add. 1-4 (2000), at 102-4.

[11] ARSIWA Commentary,ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2), Commentary to Article 54, paras. 3-6.

[12] Crawford, State Responsibility – The General Part, n. 3,at 704.

[13] Ibid., at 704-705.

[14] Ibid., at 706.

[15] G. Nolte, ‘From Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto Ago: The Classical International Law of State Responsibility and the Traditional Primacy of a Bilateral Conception of Inter-state Relations’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1083.

[16] Crawford, State Responsibility – The General Part, n. 3, at 20-21.

[17] Ibid., at 21.

[18] Ibid., at 23.

[19] Ibid.,at 24.

[20] Ibid.,at 85-92.

[21] See D. Caron, ‘The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority’ (2002) 96 AJIL 857-873, at 867. See Crawford, State Responsibility – The General Part, n. 3, pp. 87-88.

[22] See US – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, WT/DS379/R, 22 October 2010, para. 8.87ff, and discussion in Crawford, State Responsibility – The General Part, n. 3, on p. 89.

[23] P. Allott, ‘State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law’ (1988) 29 Harvard International Law Journal 1-26.

[24] V. Lowe, ‘Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses’ (1999) 10 EJIL 405-411.


Monday, October 6, 2014

Global health issues and shared state responsibility? The case of Ebola

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The current Ebola outbreak in West Africa is illustrative of a global health issue which requires collective global action. The rapid spread of the virus is alarming health experts. At the time of writing, the number of reported deaths has reached more than 3,338, and the virus could spread even further across borders. States that are most affected are Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, but Ebola cases have also been reported in Nigeria, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Calls for concerted action and international assistance

Calls for concerted action to tackle the virus have been many. On 16 September 2014, President Obama called on states to speed up the global response to the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa. He warned that without the quick deployment of health care workers, treatment centres and medical equipment, the disease could result in hundreds of thousands of deaths. President Obama said during a meeting with doctors who had just returned from West Africa, that the world, ‘has the responsibility to act, to step up and to do more. The United States intends to do more.’ This statement is interesting, since it suggests that there is a responsibility resting on the international community, obliging each state to act (and do more than it currently does) in response to the present Ebola outbreak. However, it is doubtful that he referred to a legal obligation.

The calls for cooperation and collective action are warranted since a state alone cannot tackle this global problem. Even though the contribution announced by the United States (US) (deploying 3,000 military personnel – including physicians and nurses – medicine, and equipment to Liberia and Senegal)[1] could make a difference due to its significant scale, health officials considered a coordinated approach from other Western powers crucial in order to bring the virus under control. Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank and expert in infectious diseases, said for example that ‘[e]veryone realizes that no one group or one country or one organization is going to be able to tackle this’.

It can be argued that the UN has some sort of responsibility in this matter, which would probably at least entail to hold meetings, call upon states to act, and coordinate relief efforts.[2] The UN indeed appears to have done a lot in last couple of weeks.

On 8 August 2014, the World Health Organization declared the present Ebola outbreak in West Africa ‘a public health emergency of international concern’.[3] During the United Nations (UN) system-wide coordination meeting on 13 August, the UN Secretary-General called on the international community to respond to the shortage of medical staff, protective clothing etc. Furthermore, Ban Ki-moon issued an ‘international rescue call’ for more assistance, and vowed to mobilise the UN to respond to the outbreak, on 9 September. He urged the international community to provide the money needed to stop Ebola transmission in affected countries, and to prevent the further international spread of the virus. Reportedly USD 987.8 million is needed over the next six months for a large scaled response.

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2177(2014) at an emergency meeting on the outbreak in West Africa on 18 September. This Resolution declared the present Ebola outbreak a ‘threat to international peace and security’ in its Preamble.[4] Furthermore, it called on member states to ‘lift general travel and border restrictions’ and ‘provide urgent resources and assistance’. At the meeting, the Secretary-General announced the UN was going to deploy an international emergency health mission called ‘UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response’ (UNMEER, the first-ever UN emergency health mission) with the aims to: first, stop the outbreak; second, treat the infected; third, ensure essential services; fourth, preserve stability; and fifth, prevent further outbreaks in other states. He added that its effectiveness is dependent on support from the international community. On 22 September, the UN has set up the ‘Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund’, seeking contributions from member states, but also e.g. businesses and individuals.[5] It also launched a website on the UN system’s global resonse to the Ebola outbreak.

On 19 September, the UN General Assembly underlined its commitment to respond to the outbreak ‘in a timely, effective and coordinated manner’ in Resolution GA/11552 (unanimously adopted). The Mexican representative considered the adoption to be ‘a clear testimony of international cooperation’.

At the ‘High-level Meeting on Response to the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak’ on 25 September, Ban Ki-moon noted the ‘overwhelming international political momentum for the UN to play a leading role in coordinating the global response’.

Is there a legal obligation resting on states to cooperate in response to an outbreak elsewhere?

The question that arises is whether there exists a legally binding obligation to cooperate in relation to the Ebola crises under international law. Such an obligation might be inferred from the right to health.

General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, elaborating on Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the right to health) seems to be of importance. It provides in para. 40:

States parties have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant resolutions … to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency … Each State should contribute to this task to the maximum of its capacities … Moreover, given that some diseases are easily transmissible beyond the frontiers of a State, the international community has a collective responsibility to address this problem. The economically developed States parties have a special responsibility and interest to assist the poorer developing States in this regard. (emphasis added)[6]

In this specific context, Article 44 dealing with ‘collaboration and assistance’ of the International Health Regulations (2005) provides that:

1. States Parties shall undertake to collaborate with each other, to the extent possible, in: (a) the detection and assessment of, and response to, events as provided under these Regulations; (b) the provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and logistical support, particularly in the development, strengthening and maintenance of the public health capacities required under these Regulations; (c) the mobilization of financial resources to facilitate implementation of their obligations under these Regulations. (emphasis added)

In addition, the Security Council Resolution S/RES/2177 (2014) emphasised in the Preamble that ‘the control of outbreaks of major infectious diseases requires urgent action and greater national, regional and international collaboration … stressing the crucial and immediate need for a coordinated international response’.

Do individual states have obligations?

Another question is whether some states have ‘special obligations’ to help affected states because of their status as for example former colonial power or developed state? Maybe the principle of common but differentiated responsibility applies in the context of global health?[7]

Such a ‘special responsibility’ would not necessarily only have to rest on economically developed states. The New York Times suggests that states with historical or colonial ties have a ‘special obligation’ to help the affected state in need. According to the newspaper, US administration officials urged the United Kingdom (UK) and France, which both have colonial ties to affected states, to come up with stronger responses. Thus far, France has sent USD 13 million to Guinea for medical equipment and the construction of medical centres, and USD 15.5 million and doctors to Ivory Coast and Senegal, both being former French colonies. Troops from the UK, are reportedly headed to its former colony Sierra Leone, in order to build and staff a 63-bed facility near Freetown. Such a ‘special responsibility’ does however not exist under current international law. Only a greater moral responsibility can be argued to exist for certain countries having ties with states that are in need of help.

The current Ebola crisis also shows why it will be difficult to develop such a ‘special responsibility’. There are many tough choices (e.g. which state(s) a state decides to help and which not) that seem hardly possible to be settled by law. Whenever a state helps a certain affected state, and does not help others, or to a lesser extent, this may be critically received. Some health experts for example said that Obama’s plan placed too much focus on Liberia, and not enough on Sierra Leone and Guinea. However, some six months after the start of the outbreak, Liberian authorities continue to be unable to carry out the most basic steps required to stop the spread of Ebola. In addition, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has written to President Obama and the leaders of China, Russia, as well as other states, directly asking for help. The focus of the US on Liberia seems justified because, besides Liberia’s historical ties to the US (Liberia was founded by freed US slaves in 1822), it has the highest number of Ebola infections, and it strongly needs help to deal with the problem on the ground.

Besides states having historical or colonial ties to an affected state, do neighbouring states have different or certain specific obligations if an outbreak occurs in an adjacent country? Is there an obligation to be solidary with, and provide assistance to, one’s neighbours? Or what about states in the region? Do they have a different type of responsibility compared to states that are located far away from an outbreak? An example of concerted action may be that West African states and international health organisations have adopted a new common strategy to fight Ebola on 3 July 2014. Member states especially of the region have been called on by the Security Council to ‘facilitate the delivery of assistance, including qualified, specialized and trained personnel and supplies’ at its meeting on 18 September. It is to be noted that the Council explicitly mentioned states in the region. However, also for these types of states an obligation does not seem to exist under international law.

In practice, states such as Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Germany, India, Russia and Turkey, which at first sight do not seem to have (historical) ties to the affected states, have showed their solidarity by contributing, mostly by donating money, or sending medical staff, medicines or equipment to the affected states.[8]

Generally, the content of the legal obligations of states is not very clear in this context. Now seems to be the appropriate time to develop legal instruments, or elaborating upon existing ones, as states have shown the political will to assist the affected states in a meaningful way. Hopefully the ‘coalition’ of cooperating states currently involved in the fight against Ebola can effectively deal with this global challenge, without much more loss of lives.

____________________________________________________________

[1] The US military plan to build 17 treatment centres of 100 beds each in Liberia. Once constructed, the centres would be turned over to Liberia and staffed by local and international health care providers. In addition to the USD 175 million the Obama administration has already spent, an extra USD billion to fight Ebola is possible; see Juliet Elperin, ‘U.S. may spend up to $1 billion fighting Ebola, administration says’, The Washington Post, 16 September 2014.

[2] E.g. David Nabarro (formerly appointed in August as Senior UN System Coordinator for Ebola), was re-assigned to be the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Ebola. Anthony Banbury has been appointed as Special Representative and Head of UNMEER.

[3] According to the International Health Regulations (2005) this ‘means an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response’.

[4] Also Kristen Boon, ‘The UN Security Council Takes up Ebola’, Opinio Juris, 18 September 2014.

[5] Earlier, during the UNSC emergency meeting Mr Ban also called out to non-traditional donors, e.g. businesses, to contribute in certain sectors, for example transport, see ‘UN announces mission to combat Ebola, declares outbreak ‘threat to peace and security’.

[6] Para. 44 of CESCR General Comment No. 14 provides: ‘The Committee also confirms that the following are obligations of comparable priority: [i.e. core obligations mentioned in para. 43] (c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases’.

[7] CESCR General Comment No. 14 suggests it does, e.g. para. 39: ‘if they are able to influence … by way of legal or political means … Depending on the availability of resources’; para. 40 (cited above); and para. 45: ‘particularly incumbent on States parties … in a position to assist’.

[8] See also Resolution GA/11552 for information on the contribution of several states.


The chaos in Libya is also the responsibility of Europe

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