Global health issues and shared state responsibility? The case of Ebola

Posted by: Schechinger Jessica

The current Ebola outbreak in West Africa is illustrative of a global health issue which requires collective global action. The rapid spread of the virus is alarming health experts. At the time of writing, the number of reported deaths has reached more than 3,338, and the virus could spread even further across borders. States that are most affected are Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, but Ebola cases have also been reported in Nigeria, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Calls for concerted action and international assistance

Calls for concerted action to tackle the virus have been many. On 16 September 2014, President Obama called on states to speed up the global response to the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa. He warned that without the quick deployment of health care workers, treatment centres and medical equipment, the disease could result in hundreds of thousands of deaths. President Obama said during a meeting with doctors who had just returned from West Africa, that the world, ‘has the responsibility to act, to step up and to do more. The United States intends to do more.’ This statement is interesting, since it suggests that there is a responsibility resting on the international community, obliging each state to act (and do more than it currently does) in response to the present Ebola outbreak. However, it is doubtful that he referred to a legal obligation.

The calls for cooperation and collective action are warranted since a state alone cannot tackle this global problem. Even though the contribution announced by the United States (US) (deploying 3,000 military personnel – including physicians and nurses – medicine, and equipment to Liberia and Senegal)[1] could make a difference due to its significant scale, health officials considered a coordinated approach from other Western powers crucial in order to bring the virus under control. Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank and expert in infectious diseases, said for example that ‘[e]veryone realizes that no one group or one country or one organization is going to be able to tackle this’.

It can be argued that the UN has some sort of responsibility in this matter, which would probably at least entail to hold meetings, call upon states to act, and coordinate relief efforts.[2] The UN indeed appears to have done a lot in last couple of weeks.

On 8 August 2014, the World Health Organization declared the present Ebola outbreak in West Africa ‘a public health emergency of international concern’.[3] During the United Nations (UN) system-wide coordination meeting on 13 August, the UN Secretary-General called on the international community to respond to the shortage of medical staff, protective clothing etc. Furthermore, Ban Ki-moon issued an ‘international rescue call’ for more assistance, and vowed to mobilise the UN to respond to the outbreak, on 9 September. He urged the international community to provide the money needed to stop Ebola transmission in affected countries, and to prevent the further international spread of the virus. Reportedly USD 987.8 million is needed over the next six months for a large scaled response.

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2177(2014) at an emergency meeting on the outbreak in West Africa on 18 September. This Resolution declared the present Ebola outbreak a ‘threat to international peace and security’ in its Preamble.[4] Furthermore, it called on member states to ‘lift general travel and border restrictions’ and ‘provide urgent resources and assistance’. At the meeting, the Secretary-General announced the UN was going to deploy an international emergency health mission called ‘UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response’ (UNMEER, the first-ever UN emergency health mission) with the aims to: first, stop the outbreak; second, treat the infected; third, ensure essential services; fourth, preserve stability; and fifth, prevent further outbreaks in other states. He added that its effectiveness is dependent on support from the international community. On 22 September, the UN has set up the ‘Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund’, seeking contributions from member states, but also e.g. businesses and individuals.[5] It also launched a website on the UN system’s global resonse to the Ebola outbreak.

On 19 September, the UN General Assembly underlined its commitment to respond to the outbreak ‘in a timely, effective and coordinated manner’ in Resolution GA/11552 (unanimously adopted). The Mexican representative considered the adoption to be ‘a clear testimony of international cooperation’.

At the ‘High-level Meeting on Response to the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak’ on 25 September, Ban Ki-moon noted the ‘overwhelming international political momentum for the UN to play a leading role in coordinating the global response’.

Is there a legal obligation resting on states to cooperate in response to an outbreak elsewhere?

The question that arises is whether there exists a legally binding obligation to cooperate in relation to the Ebola crises under international law. Such an obligation might be inferred from the right to health.

General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, elaborating on Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the right to health) seems to be of importance. It provides in para. 40:

States parties have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant resolutions … to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency … Each State should contribute to this task to the maximum of its capacities … Moreover, given that some diseases are easily transmissible beyond the frontiers of a State, the international community has a collective responsibility to address this problem. The economically developed States parties have a special responsibility and interest to assist the poorer developing States in this regard. (emphasis added)[6]

In this specific context, Article 44 dealing with ‘collaboration and assistance’ of the International Health Regulations (2005) provides that:

1. States Parties shall undertake to collaborate with each other, to the extent possible, in: (a) the detection and assessment of, and response to, events as provided under these Regulations; (b) the provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and logistical support, particularly in the development, strengthening and maintenance of the public health capacities required under these Regulations; (c) the mobilization of financial resources to facilitate implementation of their obligations under these Regulations. (emphasis added)

In addition, the Security Council Resolution S/RES/2177 (2014) emphasised in the Preamble that ‘the control of outbreaks of major infectious diseases requires urgent action and greater national, regional and international collaboration … stressing the crucial and immediate need for a coordinated international response’.

Do individual states have obligations?

Another question is whether some states have ‘special obligations’ to help affected states because of their status as for example former colonial power or developed state? Maybe the principle of common but differentiated responsibility applies in the context of global health?[7]

Such a ‘special responsibility’ would not necessarily only have to rest on economically developed states. The New York Times suggests that states with historical or colonial ties have a ‘special obligation’ to help the affected state in need. According to the newspaper, US administration officials urged the United Kingdom (UK) and France, which both have colonial ties to affected states, to come up with stronger responses. Thus far, France has sent USD 13 million to Guinea for medical equipment and the construction of medical centres, and USD 15.5 million and doctors to Ivory Coast and Senegal, both being former French colonies. Troops from the UK, are reportedly headed to its former colony Sierra Leone, in order to build and staff a 63-bed facility near Freetown. Such a ‘special responsibility’ does however not exist under current international law. Only a greater moral responsibility can be argued to exist for certain countries having ties with states that are in need of help.

The current Ebola crisis also shows why it will be difficult to develop such a ‘special responsibility’. There are many tough choices (e.g. which state(s) a state decides to help and which not) that seem hardly possible to be settled by law. Whenever a state helps a certain affected state, and does not help others, or to a lesser extent, this may be critically received. Some health experts for example said that Obama’s plan placed too much focus on Liberia, and not enough on Sierra Leone and Guinea. However, some six months after the start of the outbreak, Liberian authorities continue to be unable to carry out the most basic steps required to stop the spread of Ebola. In addition, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has written to President Obama and the leaders of China, Russia, as well as other states, directly asking for help. The focus of the US on Liberia seems justified because, besides Liberia’s historical ties to the US (Liberia was founded by freed US slaves in 1822), it has the highest number of Ebola infections, and it strongly needs help to deal with the problem on the ground.

Besides states having historical or colonial ties to an affected state, do neighbouring states have different or certain specific obligations if an outbreak occurs in an adjacent country? Is there an obligation to be solidary with, and provide assistance to, one’s neighbours? Or what about states in the region? Do they have a different type of responsibility compared to states that are located far away from an outbreak? An example of concerted action may be that West African states and international health organisations have adopted a new common strategy to fight Ebola on 3 July 2014. Member states especially of the region have been called on by the Security Council to ‘facilitate the delivery of assistance, including qualified, specialized and trained personnel and supplies’ at its meeting on 18 September. It is to be noted that the Council explicitly mentioned states in the region. However, also for these types of states an obligation does not seem to exist under international law.

In practice, states such as Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Germany, India, Russia and Turkey, which at first sight do not seem to have (historical) ties to the affected states, have showed their solidarity by contributing, mostly by donating money, or sending medical staff, medicines or equipment to the affected states.[8]

Generally, the content of the legal obligations of states is not very clear in this context. Now seems to be the appropriate time to develop legal instruments, or elaborating upon existing ones, as states have shown the political will to assist the affected states in a meaningful way. Hopefully the ‘coalition’ of cooperating states currently involved in the fight against Ebola can effectively deal with this global challenge, without much more loss of lives.

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[1] The US military plan to build 17 treatment centres of 100 beds each in Liberia. Once constructed, the centres would be turned over to Liberia and staffed by local and international health care providers. In addition to the USD 175 million the Obama administration has already spent, an extra USD billion to fight Ebola is possible; see Juliet Elperin, ‘U.S. may spend up to $1 billion fighting Ebola, administration says’, The Washington Post, 16 September 2014.

[2] E.g. David Nabarro (formerly appointed in August as Senior UN System Coordinator for Ebola), was re-assigned to be the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Ebola. Anthony Banbury has been appointed as Special Representative and Head of UNMEER.

[3] According to the International Health Regulations (2005) this ‘means an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response’.

[4] Also Kristen Boon, ‘The UN Security Council Takes up Ebola’, Opinio Juris, 18 September 2014.

[5] Earlier, during the UNSC emergency meeting Mr Ban also called out to non-traditional donors, e.g. businesses, to contribute in certain sectors, for example transport, see ‘UN announces mission to combat Ebola, declares outbreak ‘threat to peace and security’.

[6] Para. 44 of CESCR General Comment No. 14 provides: ‘The Committee also confirms that the following are obligations of comparable priority: [i.e. core obligations mentioned in para. 43] (c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases’.

[7] CESCR General Comment No. 14 suggests it does, e.g. para. 39: ‘if they are able to influence … by way of legal or political means … Depending on the availability of resources’; para. 40 (cited above); and para. 45: ‘particularly incumbent on States parties … in a position to assist’.

[8] See also Resolution GA/11552 for information on the contribution of several states.

A shared obligation to negotiate (and achieve?) nuclear disarmament

 Posted by: Nedeski Nataša

Every year since the International Court of Justice’s 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the UN General Assembly has adopted by a large majority a follow-up resolution. Each resolution reiterates that ‘the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to humanity and all life on Earth’, and underlines ‘the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control’. The ICJ derived this obligation from Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which provides that

[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

On 24 April 2014 the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) instituted legal proceedings before the ICJ against nine nuclear weapons possessing states: France, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel, China, Russia and North Korea. The Application states that their failure to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament amounts to a continuing breach of the obligations enshrined in Article VI NPT (to which five of these states are parties), as well as of identical obligations that exist separately under customary international law. Only Pakistan, the UK and India have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (albeit with several reservations); the remaining six states have been requested to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.

Assuming that the potential barriers to jurisdiction and admissibility would be overcome, the initiation of these proceedings calls for some reflection on the substantive content of the shared obligation(s) arising from Article VI NPT (and, if they indeed exist, identical obligations under customary international law). As the total elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved by any state in isolation, Article VI NPT requires all states parties to take part in overall disarmament efforts. But while it is clear that nuclear disarmament is a goal that can only be achieved through the combined action of all states, it remains uncertain what action is legally required of them. There exist a variety of conflicting views as to ‘what state behaviour is required to meet the nuclear disarmament obligation’.[1] Arguably, this lack of clarity has contributed to the overall failure of nuclear weapon states to take concrete steps towards the common goal of nuclear disarmament.

It has been argued that Article VI NPT ‘merely’ gives rise to an obligation to negotiate in good faith – a pactum de negotiando – which obliges individual duty-bearers to make a genuine effort towards coming to an agreement, but ‘does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement’.[2] However, in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the ICJ has held that the legal import of Article VI NPT ‘goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects – by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith’[3]. It subsequently qualified Article VI NPT as giving rise to ‘a two-fold obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations’.[4] These passages have been used to support the argument that Article VI NPT gives rise to a pactum de contrahendo – an obligation of states parties to conclude an international agreement on complete nuclear disarmament.

The difference between these two interpretations of Article VI NPT is far from negligible. An obligation to negotiate in good faith is generally considered to be an obligation of conduct, which entails that each duty-bearer can independently fulfil or breach its obligation by conducting or failing to conduct negotiations in good faith. It would be perfectly possible for one duty-bearer to fulfil its obligation by negotiating in good faith whereas another breaches its obligation by failing to do so (though how a state may demonstrate good faith will of course be up for discussion). In the end, whether or not negotiations bring about a certain result does not have a necessary bearing on the fulfilment (or breach) of the obligation to negotiate.

This seems to be different when it comes to the obligation to conclude negotiations and achieve the result of ‘nuclear disarmament in all its aspects’. If Article VI NPT indeed requires the achievement of such a result, the duty-bearers of this obligation will be highly dependent upon one another when it comes to complying with this requirement. The desired result of complete nuclear disarmament, whether or not through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty, cannot be brought about by a duty-bearer on its own; regardless of the amount of effort it puts in or the extent of good faith it displays (for example by unilaterally declaring that it will dispose of its entire nuclear arsenal). This would entail that the obligation cannot be fulfilled by any duty-bearer as long as the result of total nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. At the same time, it is not clear when this obligation would be breached, as no definitive timeframe has been set out within which negotiations should be concluded and/or complete nuclear disarmament should be achieved. Should a breach nevertheless be established, the question arises whether this would automatically result in shared responsibility for all duty-bearers.

The proceedings instituted by the RMI may provide the ICJ with an opportunity to clarify the substantive content of Article VI NPT. At first sight, the ICJ’s pronouncements in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion seem to support the argument that Article VI NPT gives rise to an obligation that goes beyond a ‘mere’ obligation to negotiate. But how far does that obligation go? Does it really require that the result of complete nuclear disarmament is achieved before duty-bearers can fulfil the obligation, regardless of the result achieved by each duty-bearer individually? Should nuclear disarmament necessarily be achieved through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty? And would a breach of the obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament entail that both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states would share the resulting responsibility?

In the midst of these uncertainties, what does seem evident is that progress towards nuclear disarmament is occurring at a disturbingly slow pace. A clarification of what it is that states must do in order to comply with their legal obligations will make it more difficult to justify their inaction; hopefully bringing us one step closer to the collective goal of nuclear disarmament.

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[1] Legal Memorandum by the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and the International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, Good Faith Negotiations Leading to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice (International Human Rights Clinic Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 2009) at 4. Available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/docs/goodfaithnegs.pdf.

[2] Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J. Series A/B No. 42, p. 108, at p. 116.

[3] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, at para. 99 (emphasis added).

[4] Ibid., at para. 100 (emphasis added).

Responsibility of the UK for detentions in Afghanistan: questions of attribution of conduct

 Posted by: Bérénice Boutin

In a decision of 2 May 2014, the British High Court of Justice held that the United Kingdom (UK) was responsible for the continued detention of an individual in Afghanistan, in violation of human rights law. The decision has already been commented on, notably here, here and here, focusing on the affirmation by the Court that the UK’s international human rights obligations applied to the non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan. This post will briefly address another important aspect of the decision, that of attribution of conduct.

The case was brought by Serdar Mohammed, an Afghan national who had been captured by British forces part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in April 2010 on the suspicion of being a member of the Taliban. He remained detained without charges until July 2010, when he was transferred to Afghan authorities. He claimed compensation from the UK for a breach of his right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR.

Apart from finding that the detention was in breach of applicable human rights obligations, the Court engaged in a relatively extensive discussion of whether the disputed conduct was to be attributed to the UK (paras 158–187, pp 47–55), thereby adding a new stone to the debate on allocation of responsibility in international military operations.

The Court answered the question of attribution in two steps: first, it determined to whom the conduct of ISAF should be attributed as a matter of principle, and then asked whether the detention itself should be considered an act of ISAF or whether it actually was an act of the UK. A number of scholars have considered such a two steps method appropriate to implement the test of effective control: they have suggested to first identify which entity is presumably responsible in view of command arrangements before enquiring whether a specific conduct was actually controlled by the troop-contributing State.[1]

The Court wrongly concluded that the conduct of ISAF was in general attributable to the UN because it possessed ‘ultimate authority and control’, but correctly held that the specific detention of Serdar Mohammed was to be attributed to the UK. These two parts of the reasoning of the Court on attribution are explained below.

Grounding once again its argument in the Behrami and Saramati cases, the UK had contended that since British forces in Afghanistan were operating as part of the ISAF – a NATO force that was authorised by the UN – the conduct should be attributed to the UN. If courts in Al-Jedda could distinguish the situation in Iraq from the one in Kosovo on the facts, the Court was here bound to recognise the close similarity of the case at hand with the detention of Mr Saramati by the NATO-led KFOR:

177. […] It seems to me that the chain of delegation of command for ISAF is essentially similar to the chain of delegation and command for KFOR, as described in the judgment of the European Court in the Behrami and Saramati cases.

The British Court did not dismiss Behrami and therefore held that, prima facie, the conduct of ISAF was attributable to the UN:

178. In these circumstances, although I do not find the question easy, I consider that the UN Security Council has “effective control” (and “ultimate authority and control”) over ISAF in the sense required to enable conduct of ISAF to be attributed to the UN. Thus, if the detention of [Serdar Mohammed] had been authorised by [ISAF] […], I would expect the European Court to hold that the detention was not attributable to the respondent state, applying the same analysis as it did in the Behrami and Saramati cases.

As often denounced with regard to the Behrami decision, holding the UN responsible for the conduct of forces over which it has no control makes little sense and is not in line with the established test of effective control. Under this test, the conduct of ISAF should rather have been prima facie attributed to NATO which was vested with operational command over the force. The UN only authorised the deployment of ISAF and did not have operational control over its activities in the field. The conduct of ISAF should therefore not have been considered as a conduct of the UN.

While the argument on attribution of ISAF conduct to the UN is weak, the Court nonetheless reached a reasonable conclusion in the second step of its reasoning. It analysed the distribution of authority between NATO, ISAF and the UK, and demonstrated that the detention of Serdar Mohammed was exclusively under the authority of the UK.

Indeed, the Court showed that, as far as detention operations were concerned, the UK was acting independently from ISAF, according to its own policies and through its own channels. Under ISAF’s rules, individuals could be detained for up to 96 hours after which they had to be transferred to Afghan authorities. Considering that ‘detaining individuals beyond 96 hours can yield vital intelligence’, the UK decided to adopt a different policy allowing longer detentions by its troops. As a result, detention operations by British troops in Afghanistan have been conducted under the direct authority of the British Ministry of Defence:

180. […] the chain of command for authorising detention set out in the MOD Standard Operating Instruction J3-9 shows that the detention authority is the Commander of Joint Force Support (Afghanistan) (“Comd JFS p(A)”), who reports directly to the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (“PJHQ”), which in turn reports to the MOD. By contrast, the chart shows that the relation between the UK detention authority and the ISAF chain of command is one of liaison and coordination only.

Considering that the disputed ‘detention was authorised and reviewed exclusively by UK officials and Ministers’, the Court held that the conduct was attributed to the UK which actually exercised authority over this part of the operation, and not to the UN and NATO.

In effect, the Court demonstrated that the specific disputed conduct was under the effective control of the UK which concretely exercised authority over its troops in detentions matter. The conclusion of the case is therefore in line with the principle enshrined in Article 7 ARIO.

Like in Nuhanovic, attribution of conduct of international forces to the contributing State is justified by a clear link between specific government’s decisions over operational matters and the disputed conduct. In Nuhanovic, the Dutch government was in close contact with the contingent commander and had directly instructed to evacuate the compound. In the case at hand, the direct control of the UK government over detentions justified to attribute the conduct to the State.

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1. See eg: A Sari, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO: The Missing Link’ (2012) 9(1) International Organizations Law Review 7; M Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston, 2005) at 100.

Facilitating drone strikes: sharing responsibility for sharing intelligence

 Posted by: Nedeski Nataša

The exchange of information between Dutch intelligence services and the United States National Security Agency (NSA) is no longer taking place entirely outside the public eye. After a graph published in German news magazine Der Spiegel in August 2013 initially seemed to suggest that the NSA had intercepted 1.8 million records of metadata from Dutch phone calls in the period of December 2012 to January 2013, it became clear this February that Dutch intelligence services had gathered these records themselves, and had subsequently shared them with the NSA. This information consisted of metadata records gathered in the context of anti-terrorism and military operations abroad.

A substantial share of Dutch intelligence efforts is directed towards Somalia, and millions of Somali phone calls have been intercepted from both the Dutch town of Burum and Dutch navy ship HMS Rotterdam. The Netherlands has been collecting this information in order to support the Dutch contribution to the navy missions combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The (meta)data is shared with the NSA (who do not have access to Somali telephone traffic) and in return the US has provided the Netherlands with technical support needed to intercept local telephone traffic from the HMS Rotterdam.[1]

But it appears that the US has been using this data for a different purpose. Since 2011 the US has been carrying out drone strikes in Somalia in the context of its war against terrorism, and on 8 March 2014 Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad revealed that it is likely that the United States is using Dutch data to support drone strike operations on (alleged) members of Al-Shahaab in Somalia. NRC Handelsblad bases this assertion on several Dutch and US documents made public by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, and reports that the Dutch Ministry of Defence cannot exclude that the metadata shared with the US is used in order to facilitate such targeted killings.

According to research done by The Intercept metadata play a crucial role in US targeted killings. This places the Netherlands in a tedious position, as the legality of targeted killing by drone strikes remains highly controversial. Assuming that these attacks can at least in some circumstances be qualified as breaches of international law, the Netherlands could be contributing to internationally wrongful acts committed by the US. And it is in good company: the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia have all been accused of involvement in US drone strikes through intelligence-sharing.

A variety of actors appears to be involved in the US’ wrongful acts, including not only states but also individuals. The question that inevitably arises is the following: can these international actors be held internationally responsible for sharing intelligence that facilitates the commission of wrongful acts by the US?

State responsibility for aid or assistance

The obvious place to start in answering this question would be article 16 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, which provides that a State can be held internationally responsible when it aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. When applied to our scenario, it needs to be established that the conduct in question would be internationally wrongful, if it were to be committed by the Netherlands. It is indeed arguable that this would be the case. Moreover, the Netherlands must have had knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act. While it is unclear whether the Netherlands was initially aware of the fact that their intelligence might be used to facilitate US drone strikes, it should surely know now (which is relevant as long as the Dutch keep sharing intelligence).

However, it may prove to be more difficult to meet the requirements mentioned in the ILC’s commentaries, which clarify that knowledge is not enough; the Netherlands should have intended to facilitate the US drone strikes in Somalia.[2] Establishing a State’s intent remains a daunting task, which becomes even more difficult in situations that are characterised by such a remarkable lack of transparency.

Moreover, it is not entirely clear what threshold aid or assistance should reach in order to result in responsibility. The ILC’s commentaries at one point state that the aid or assistance should have ‘contributed significantly to the act’, but at another point assert that it ‘may have been only an incidental factor in the commission of the primary act’.[3] In any case, chances are that the extent in which Dutch intelligence has facilitated US drone strikes will remain uncertain. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has stated that revealing the extent in which intelligence contributes to a specific mission would reveal the mode of operation of Dutch intelligence services, which it cannot do as this would endanger both the operation and the lives of soldiers.

Individual criminal responsibility for complicity in war crimes

NGOs Reprieve and the Foundation for Fundamental Rights (FFR) have chosen to address this question from a different angle. On 19 February 2014 they submitted a communication to the International Criminal Court (ICC), requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the role of the UK, Germany, Australia and other NATO allies in US drone strikes in Pakistan. One commentator has already pointed out the difficulties that might arise in establishing the ICC’s jurisdiction.

While the US and Pakistan are not parties to the Rome Statute, the communication argues that the ICC has jurisdiction because a) the drone strikes are launched from Afghanistan, which is a party to the Rome Statute, and b) nationals of the UK, Germany and Australia (which are all parties to the Rome Statute) are potentially facilitating these drone strikes through intelligence sharing. Reprieve and FFR would like to see these individuals be held criminally responsible by the ICC for their complicity in US war crimes. Though there seems to be far less information available on US drone attacks in Somalia, theoretically speaking a similar argument could be made regarding the role of Dutch nationals in targeted killings on Somali territory.

But even though the practice of intelligence sharing gives rise to a variety of potential shared responsibility scenarios, there is one main problem that stands in the way of determining responsibility: the complete lack of transparency surrounding drone strikes and intelligence sharing. It appears that there is currently no international obligation that would require states to disclose such information. Unfortunately, this will more often than not entail that rather than establishing shared responsibility, we are simply left with no responsibility.

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[1] See NRC, ‘The secret role of the Dutch in the American war on terror’, by Steven Derix and Huib Modderkolk, available at http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/.

[2] International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001 (A/56/10), at 66, para. 5

[3] Ibid.; also p. 67, para. 10.

Who’s responsible for protecting terrorist suspects?

 Posted by: Heijer Maarten den

In its recent judgment in Othman, the European Court of Human Rights held that the United Kingdom could not expel a Muslim cleric suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda to Jordan. The judgment is of interest for our SHARES project, as the Court on the one hand cautions against international cooperation in the sphere of extradition of terrorist suspects – stressing the responsibilities under human rights law of expelling States – but on the other hand urges States that definitely wish to expel or extradite to do so only in close cooperation with receiving States so as to protect against maltreatment and to ensure a fair trial.

Othman, who had been allowed to reside in the UK as refugee in 1993 and was detained there in 2002 under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act which was introduced two months after 9/11, is facing charges of terrorist conspiracies in Jordan. The European Court found that there was a real risk that evidence obtained by torture would be used against Othman during his trial in Jordan. The judgment, together with other recent pronouncements of the European human rights court, constitutes important guidance for those countries struggling with the twofold objective of bringing to trial and permanently relocating terrorist suspects, while at the same time guaranteeing their human rights. On this very issue, also see André’s post on the UK Court of Appeals decision in Yunus Ramhmatullah v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs et ano.

Although the judgment was not well received in the United Kingdom (see here and here) and Prime Minister Cameron publicly voiced his disappointment over it only days after it was published in a speech before the Council of Europe – in support of his argument that the European Court is in dire need of reform – the judgment is on closer inspection also receptive to on-going efforts of Western countries to extradite or expel terrorists. Indeed, Amnesty’s Julia Hall describes the judgment as ‘an alarming setback for human rights’, in view of the Court’s holding under Article 3 of the Convention that the diplomatic assurances negotiated between the Jordanian and UK governments effectively removed the risk that Othman would be tortured or otherwise ill-treated in Jordan.

Thus, notwithstanding the Court’s strong stance on the admissibility of evidence obtained by torture, the judgment may open a path for Western countries facing the problem of not being able to remove terrorist suspects due to human rights concerns, to try to alleviate these concerns by procuring diplomatic assurances and cooperate in post-expulsion monitoring. That the European Court sees diplomatic assurances as a viable option in this respect is also confirmed in last week’s judgment in M.S. v Belgium (French only) where the Court found that the expulsion from Belgium to Iraq of a Al-Qaeda suspect would violate Article 3 of the European Convention but adding, notably, that the Belgian authorities should have obtained a series of safeguards from the Iraqi authorities with a view to ensuring his safety in Iraq. Although the Court has in the past shown reluctance to accord weight to diplomatic assurances from countries which systematically violate human rights (see for example the judgment in Saadi v Italy, the Court is now signalling that even in respect of such countries, it may be worthwhile to consider the procurement of diplomatic guarantees and the setting up of monitoring mechanisms with and in the receiving country.

The M.S. v Belgium case also underscores that it may well be that, in some cases, diplomatic assurances will be the only realistic option for States who want to remove terrorist suspects – since these persons are not particularly welcome in third countries. Like the U.S. government in respect of the Guantanamo Bay detainees, Belgium had sought resettlement possibilities in a whole range of countries (the judgment mentions Venezuela, Burundi, Vietnam, Burkina Faso and Costa Rica) – but all apparently refused. Absent any resettlement possibilities, it will be the ‘joint responsibility’ of the country of origin and the country of residence to find a solution which is satisfying to all parties.

One positive offspring of this development is that Western countries have a clear interest in contributing to improving the quality of justice systems in receiving countries. One example of a country where international efforts in this respect appear to bear fruit is Rwanda. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 2011 in the case of Uwinkindi considered the justice system in Rwanda sufficiently improved so that it for the first time allowed for a case to be transferred to the Rwanda prosecutor. This reasoning was some months later confirmed by the European Court in the case of Ahorugeze v Sweden. In both cases, mention was not only made of successful international efforts to improve the quality of the Rwandese judiciary and detention conditions, but the Courts also referred to diplomatic guarantees as a means to ensure international standards are met. In respect of Kenya, international efforts are also underway to ensure the fair prosecution of piracy suspects. However, as we reported, a German court found the current agreements in place between the EU and Kenya to insufficiently remove the risk of ill-treatment.

Obligations of the UK in respect of a Pakistani national detained by the US in Afghanistan

 Posted by: Nollkaemper André

At Lawfare, Robert Chesney notes an decision of the UK Court of Appeals (Civil Division) of 14 December that raises interesting questions of shared responsibility. The case is Yunus Ramhmatullah v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs et ano. The Court, by an opinion of the Master of the Rolls, held that a Pakistani man (Yunus Rahmatullah) held by the US military in Afghanistan may pursue a habeas corpus petition against the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence and for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Yunus Rahmatullah was captured in Iraq by British forces in 2004 and then transferred to US custody. In 2004 the US moved Yunus Rahmatullah from Iraq to Afghanistan. Despite the fact that a US Detainee Review Board determined in 2010 that the applicant was not an enduring security threat, he remains at Bagram, which, as noted by the lower court, was said to be ‘notorious for human rights abuses’. In May 2010, the applicant’s cousin learned that he was detained at Bagram, and filed the writ of habeas corpus that led to the present judgment.

The ‘SHARES’ aspect of the case is that under international law, the UK maintain obligations vis-à-vis Yunus Rahmatullah, even after he was handed over the US.

In case of Rahmatullah not being treated in conformity with the Geneva Conventions, both under the Third (Article 12) and the Fourth (Article 45) Geneva Convention, the UK had the obligation to take effective measures to correct the situation or request his return.

At the time, the UK certainly was aware of this obligation. To ensure US willingness to protect persons transferred by the UK to the US, and their return if so requested, in 2003 a Memorandum of Understanding was concluded between the UK and the US Governments. This provided that the transfer of persons will be implemented in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, that detainees transferred by the UK to the US would be returned to the UK without delay upon request by the latter, and that the rendition to territories outside Iraq of transferred detainees ‘will only be made upon the mutual arrangement of the Detaining Power and the Accepting Power.’

The combined effect of the Geneva Conventions and the MoU, thus, is that the UK retained obligations vis-à-vis Yunus Rahmatullah, even after he was handed over the US. The UK retained the obligation to secure his return and through this end any breach of his rights at the hands of the power to which he had been transferred. In other words, these provisions both form the basis of a possible shared responsibility of the UK and the US, and a procedural means for the UK to avoid breaching its own obligations.

Based on these provisions, Yunus Rahmatullah now applied for a writ of habeas corpus – in effect asking the UK to exercise its rights under the Geneva Conventions and the MoU. The Secretary of State argued that Yunus Rahmatullah was under the  control of the US Government and that the writ  should be rejected.

The Court found otherwise. It held that in the light of the Geneva Conventions and the MoU, there was ‘a substantial case for saying that the UK Government is under an international legal obligation to demand the return of the applicant, and the US Government is bound to accede to such a request.’ It found that the Government had provided insufficient evidence to conclude that such action could not be effective.

Interestingly, the Court found it unnecessary (and ‘inappropriate’) to address the question ‘whether, by not taking that course, it might, conceivably, be said that as a result of the combination of Section 1 of the 1957 Geneva Conventions Act and Article 130 of Geneva III, the UK Government could be aiding or abetting a “grave crime”’ (the Court here presumably referred to Geneva III). The question may indeed be premature, but the scenario is not entirely unrealistic and indeed may induce the negotiation of  agreements such as the MoU in question that enable states to exercise their responsibility vis-à-vis detained persons.

The case illustrated how states, through the Geneva Conventions and, as added security, the MoU, ex ante make sure that they retain the rights necessary to perform obligations incumbent on them. In addition it demonstrates how responsibility may continue, even after control is transferred.